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The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry but 
also  the  consensual  perception  of  banking  risks,  contagion  and  their  implication  for  banking 
regulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic points 
of the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instability 
and  fragility of financial institutions.  
The  use  of  ratings  as  carved  in  stone  and  lack  of  adequate  procedure  to  swiftly  deal  with 
systemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail).  
 
The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered in 
other contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. In 
the future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. This 
may occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure, 
adopt  an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management.  Indeed, there are two 
approaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises will 
occur infrequently, but are inescapable. 
                 
The author is grateful to Agustin Laudier and to the editors for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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 The best way to think of it is to consider a crisis as an accident, a Poisson event that might on 
average occur every 80 years and all efforts should be made to reduce its impact. The alternative 
is to consider that crises are a manageable event and that all efforts should be made to avoid its 
repetition. As the debate has evolved this distinction between rare events and manageable events 
has never been explicitly made. The aim of our contribution is to clarify this choice and to argue 
that some of the regulatory reforms that have been agreed upon may not have been the most basic 
efficient ones and may lead to an inefficient banking industry. In particular, if bank crises are 
unavoidable, then we should structure clear cut provisions for banks bailouts that specify how the 
rights of each stakeholder are redefined, an issue that has implications regarding the amount of 
public and private bailouts as well as the incentives of bank’s shareholders and their boards of 
directors. 
In what follows, we will briefly consider the origin of the failure in banking regulation and then 
turn to regulatory reform. Section 2 considers the overall rationale for banking regulator. Section 3 
is  devoted  to  the  key  role  of  banks  bankruptcy  rules.  This  has  implications  regarding  bank’s 
corporate governance, an issue examined in section 4. Section 5 explores how the safety net should 
be  modified  to  take  into  account  the  lessons  of  the  current  crisis.  The  implications  regarding 
macro-prudential  policy  are  briefly  addressed  in  section  6.  The  problems  of  international 
coordination  are  addressed  in  section  7.  Section  8  concludes  pointing  out  the  critical  choices 
regulators have to face and their implications for the future of the financial industry.  
 
 
1. BANKING REGULATION FAILURE 
 
While the analysis of the crisis is not the aim of this paper, some of the aspects of the failure of 
the safety net must be considered as they are the reason for a drastic regulatory change. It is 
generally agreed that the social cost of banks’ failure is not internalized by banks’ management. 
This social cost reflects the non-pecuniary investments made by the firms in their relationship with 
the bank (relationship lending), the cost to financial stability and, first and foremost, the cost of a 
possible  contagion  to  other  banks.  Prudential  regulation  is  precisely  aimed  at  limiting  the 
externalities created by a bank failure. This could be done either by acting upon the probability of 
a bank’s failure (as it happens with capital regulation) or by reducing its impact (as in deposit 
insurance).  In the majority of countries, this is done through the creation of a safety net, consisting 
of 1) Supervision, 2) Deposit insurance, 3) Capital requirements, 4) A lender of last resort policy 
and 5) Orderly bail-out/liquidation procedures. The current crisis has put these five components 
under great strain, some resisting better than others its impact. 
 
Although the mechanisms of deposit insurance and lender of last resort have been quite helpful 
in preventing a deepening of the financial crisis, prudential supervision, capital requirement and 
the adequate mechanism for orderly bail-out or liquidation of financial institutions did fail. 
Prudential supervision failed to identify the high levels of risk and the sources of relevant risks 
(liquidity risk). Capital requirements were based on incorrect risk measurement models that failed POST CRISIS REGULATION  3
to take into account the risks associated with partial securitization, over the counter operations and 
the use of mark-to market accounting rules without adequate provisioning. Finally, the bail-out or 
liquidation decision was the inefficient result of a lengthy bargaining process with the bank’s stake 
holders. 
The inadequacy of the safety net was clear once the procyclicality of capital regulation (whether 
Basel I or II) was established with its consequences; the fact that banks were led to liquidate their 
assets at fire sale prices. 
In addition, the transfer of banking risks to the non-banking financial industry, thus creating a so-
called shadow banking system has led to a situation where banking risk has escaped the regulatory 
authorities. Finally, market discipline enthroned in Basel II third pillar, as a key principle, did not 
produce the expected results. 
 
 
2. BANKING REGULATION REFORM 
Detecting the necessary changes to be made in order to redesign an improved financial regulation 
framework can be undertaken in two different ways. To begin with, one may be tempted to take as 
a  starting  point  the  flaws  in  regulation  the  previous  section  has  uncovered.  Alternatively,  an 
overall perspective could be built by starting from the basic market failure financial regulation is 
supposed to address. We will follow this second approach not only because the majority of reports 
have adopted the first one, so that using the market failure approach should be more valuable in 
complementing them, but also because in fixing every single element there is a risk of omitting a 
whole area where regulatory reform might be required.  In other words, it is also important to 
identify the mechanisms that did not exist and whose absence has, in fact, aggravated the crisis. 
A second demarcation with respect to other reports on the current crisis is here necessary. It 
concerns the focus of our approach. We take the view that crises, although a rare event whether 
systemic or affecting a too-big-to-fail or a Large Complex Financial Intermediation will always be 
there,  emerging  from  completely  different  reasons  than  the  past  ones,  presumably  the  most 
unexpected  ones.  This  implies  emphasizing  crisis  management,  and,  in  particular,  emergency 
recapitalization.  Many reports on the crisis seem to be excessively focused on the eradication of 
crises with the consequence that the importance of contingent planning for crisis management is 
implicitly played down. It is true that a good regulatory framework should reduce the probability 
of systemic crises but still, the lack of mechanisms in place to deal with them is particularly costly, 
as  the  current  crisis has  shown.  Consequently,  a  proposal  for  financial  regulatory  reform  will 
consist  of  both  mechanisms  to  limit  the  probability  of  a  crisis  and  mechanisms  for  crisis 
management once the crisis has settled. 
  
2.1 Bank Bankruptcy Externality 
To provide a sound foundation for our analysis it is worth recalling that, in order to solve a 
market failure one, has to address the main externality it produces. In this case, the origin of the 
externality lies in the social cost of banks’ bankruptcy and the mechanism of financial distress 
contagion among banks. Contagion, is more important for banks than for other industries because 
the very nature of banks role in the economy makes them holders of illiquid assets and liquid 
liabilities (see, e.g. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), thus  making them sensitive to financial fragility, POST CRISIS REGULATION  4
whether taking the form of bank runs or simply illiquidity crises. In turn, the failure of many banks 
threatens the well functioning of the banking industry ability to continue transferring property 
rights with legal certainty, a point critical for any transaction in the society.  
 
2.2 Debt pricing Distortions 
As mentioned, the safety net is designed precisely to limit the probability of a bank bankruptcy 
and  its  worst  effects  on  depositors.  Yet,  regarding  prices,  this  implies  that  a  distortion  is 
introduced, as the safety net will protect from market risk. In particular, deposits remuneration is 
independent of risk both because of the existence of the safety net and because depositors do not 
lend to their bank as a result of a risk return computation but to gain access to the payment system. 
In addition, the existence of a safety net promotes the perception of a safe banking industry, that, 
for obvious reasons, neither the bank itself nor the regulator will contradict. Thus generating a 
possible understating of risk for all types of liabilities, whether insured or uninsured also, the 
perception that in case of a bank bankruptcy the bank will be bailed out and liability holders will 
be  fully  reimbursed  (implicit  guaranties)  aggravates  this  understatement  in  the  risk  of  bank’s 
liabilities.  This  implies  that  banks  will  tend  to  hold  too  much  debt  (thus  justifying  a  capital 
regulation) and that they will tend to use debt based hybrid instruments rather than core equity to 
cope with solvency regulation. 
Regulatory reform should therefore try to reduce the pricing distortion, and this is related to the 
possible internalization by each agent of the externalities it generates. Such internalization will be 
possible, at least partially by a rigorous design of the banks’ bankruptcy process as well as their 
corporate governance. This is why we will start by reviewing the necessary changes in banks’ 
bankruptcy procedures, as this will reduce the price distortions that affect banks’ liabilities. Bank’s 
bankruptcy rules directly affect the banks’ stakeholders’ profits and losses and therefore shape the 
bank strategy, which depends on the risks the bank is taking. Corporate governance will define the 
ways in which shareholders set manager’s incentives to create value for shareholders and should 
therefore be dealt with next, in order to take into account possible biases, such as short term 
orientation, excessive risk taking and fake alphas. Still, it would be deceptive to rely exclusively 
on these two mechanisms to restore market efficiency. It will therefore be necessary to turn to the 
safety net distortions and try to correct the deficiencies of prudential regulation, both at the micro 
and at the macro level. Finally, a special mention has to be made for international issues, as their 
complexity makes financial regulation design even more challenging. 
 
 
3. BANK’S BANKRUPTCY RULES 
Theoretically if bank’s bankruptcy rules were clearly set and duly enforced, the price of banks’ 
liabilities would reflect their risk, thus leading to an efficient allocation. In order to do this, it is 
necessary, beyond efficient priced deposit insurance, that each type of liability holder knows the 
losses it is to face both in case of systemic risk and in case of its own bank bankruptcy. When, in 
addition, bankruptcy costs are present and, as mentioned before, renegotiation costs are huge, clear 
cut bankruptcy rules allow increasing the value of the banking firm by decreasing uncertainty and 
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The simplest way to think of bankruptcy rules is to consider the Modigliani-Miller (1958) perfect 
capital  market  hypothesis.  The  results  are  then  quite  surprising  because  the  lack  of  conflicts 
between the different claim holders in such an environment contrasts with the dramatic conflicts 
between the different types of debt holders that are witnessed during a banking crisis. 
As  emphasized by  Lander and Ueda (2009), an orderly bankruptcy procedure should not be 
costly to taxpayers, because when the perfect capital market of Modigliani Miller is considered as 
a first approximation, it is clear that a debt equity swap does not change the value of the firm, nor 
the value to debt holders and equity holders as it leaves the total value of the firm unchanged. In 
addition, if we depart from the standard-no taxes- no bankruptcy costs, a bank in distress is facing 
high costs because of the high expected bankruptcy costs the market forecasts. A debt equity swap 
in this case reduces the expected bankruptcy costs and increases the value of the firm. So, conflicts 
of interest could be the result of either 1) free riding by one type of claimholders on another, as, for 
instance,  a  debt  for  equity  swap  for  junior  debt  holders  will  benefit  senior  debt  holders,  2) 
asymmetric information or 3) the stakeholders expectations to be rescued by taxpayers. In any of 
these cases, defining ex ante contracts that impose a restructuring of all debtors’ rights in case of 
distress reduces the contractual costs, both of renegotiation and of bankruptcy. 
 
As  mentioned,  protecting  financial  stability  and  the  security  of  transactions  through  the 
preservation of the payment system implies a speedy resolution of banks’ financial distress which 
puts pressure on the Treasury to bail out banks. Renegotiation of stakeholders’ claims leads to 
delays and additional costs, as the bank management decisions may be impaired by its possibly 
negative net equity position. The inefficiency of the standard bankruptcy procedure calls therefore 
for the design of a special bankruptcy code for banks. Such a specific bankruptcy procedure should 
1) provide for speedy recapitalization implying a reduction in debt that generates common equity 
2) cope with the bank difficulties whether they are originated by the inability of the bank to fulfil 
its payment commitments or by negative equity and 3) ensure that the resulting bank (a “good 
bank”) has a sufficiently low risk to be acceptable by its peers, in particular in the interbank 
market. Of course, the development of such a scheme will still leave open the complexities of 
bankruptcy for non-banking institutions that are systemic but part of the “shadow banking”, as the 
current crisis has revealed. 
These general characteristics can be achieved in different ways depending on how, once a bank is 
declared critically undercapitalized, the claims of its stakeholders are redefined. Consider three 
examples:  1) The simplest one, advocated by Flannery, is the funding of banks through reverse 
convertibles that automatically become equity once the value of equity hits a critical level. 2) A 
mandatory debt equity swap 3) The good bank/bad bank resolution, (See box 1) which has been 
often used in the resolution of a banking crisis (Sweden, Mexico). For each banks the liabilities are 
classified depending on whether they are fully insured (or whether they will be fully repaid) or not, 
their maturity and their seniority. Regarding the assets, for each bank, the separation concerns 
information sensitive assets. Those assets that are either safe or have a well identified cash flow 
distribution and, therefore, whose valuation is accurate should be distinguished from those that are 
subject to high uncertainty on the underlying cash flows. Assets in the first category will constitute 
the “good bank”; those in the second will be acquired by an Asset Management Company that will 
either  sell  them  to  the  market  or  hold  them  to  maturity.  The  fully  insured  liabilities  will  be POST CRISIS REGULATION  6
liabilities on the good bank and the deposit insurance company will inject the funds necessary to 











































The good bank/bad bank separation in the Swedish experience 
The Swedish banking crisis of the nineties is considered exemplary in terms of the low cost it 
implied and of the good practices that were implemented. There are lessons to be learnt from the 
management of the Sweden rescue plan. The general principle is to get uncertainty out of the system 
by ring fencing the bad assets.  
The good bank/bad bank scheme was implemented in combination with the extensive use of Asset 
Management Corporations (AMCs). The “bad bank” part of the bank was transferred to the asset 
management corporations at carefully assessed market values. The AMC proceeded then to regroup 
the assets and offer them to potential buyers. Because all the pressure associated with the 
preservation of banking stability and the well-functioning of the payment system had vanished, 
“fire-sale” of the assets was avoided. The Government, (later confirmed by Parliament), issued an 
unlimited guarantee to all depositors and counterparties to Swedish credit institutions, which came 
at a cost to the tax payers. Still, this made it clear that shareholders were excluded from this 
guarantee and avoided any delay in renegotiating with the other claimholders. From that 
perspective, it could be argued that all the benefits from the good bank/bad bank scheme were not 
obtained.  
The Bank Support Authority, was in charge of deciding which banks to reconstruct and which to 
liquidate. His mission was disclosed to the general public. The measures were designed to minimise 
costs for the Government and the risk of moral hazard. The credibility, political support and 
independence of the Bank Support Authority was a key element in the swift resolution of the crisis. 
The procedure, sometimes referred as the “hammock” procedure, consisted in  
1)  Writing down the bank’s bad loans.  
2)  Testing the bank in a micro- and macroeconomic model.  
3)  Giving support to the banks that pass the test and closing, merging or restructuring in an 
orderly manner those that fail.  
Hence, the procedure was on a case-by-case basis but with clear transparent rules that avoided 
delays and renegotiation.  
As the current crisis has higher levels of uncertainty regarding the value of some assets, a bad bank 
or the AMC may have to hold assets for a longer period of time. Still, the flexibility of the good 
bank/bad bank separation and the possibility to have a case by case approach makes it a powerful 
tool to be applied in a banking crisis. 
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The  current  UK  proposal  of  banks  drafting  a  “living  will”  to  simplify  the  management, 
restructuring and sale of its assets, if enforceable, would produce a similar contingent reallocation 
of property rights in the event of the bank’s bankruptcy. According to the current proposal a living 
will should outline which divestitures the bank would sell, how clients’ assets will be transferred 
to another institution and how they would liquidate the assets on their trading books within 60 
days. 
The  Squam  Lake  group  suggests  a  mechanism  for  the  expedited  resolution  of  distressed 
institutions that requires banks to hold reverse convertibles. To avoid possible price manipulations, 
conversion is triggered only when two conditions are met: first, the regulatory authorities have to 
announce the start of a systemic crisis; second, the conditions on the bank share price specified in 
the reverse convertible have to be met. The need for a regulator to declare the beginning of a crisis 
is necessary because otherwise the hard incentives of the debt contract would be lost.  
 
Defining banks’ bankruptcy rules that could be contingent on the existence of a systemic crisis 
constitutes one of the most imperatives changes in banking regulation. Indeed, this will allow to 
minimize the required emergency recapitalisation. Funds it will also systematize the sale of banks’ 
assets  (as  the  US  Public-Private  Investment  Program  for  Legacy  Assets,.  PPIP)  if  deemed 
necessary.  Finally  it  would  allow  a  more  flexible  capital  requirement  regulation  during  a 
downturn. 
The  design  of  bank  specific  bankruptcy  rules  benefits  from  the  insights  of  contract  theory. 
Bebchuk (1988) and Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) have suggested mechanisms to reduce the 
costs and uncertainties associated with  bankruptcy procedures. Using their insights could greatly 
improve the efficient resolution of banking crisis. In both contributions the rights of the different 
stakeholders are defined by options that depend upon the seniority of debt.  Because during a 
systemic crisis the objectives of the regulator may prefer a speedy resolution to the efficient choice 
of liquidation or restructuring, imbedding the transformation of debt into another type of option on 
the bank’s asset will improve the efficiency of the systemic crisis resolution.  
 
Of  course,  changing  banks’  bankruptcy  rules  may  imply  a  higher  risk  for  debt  holders  and 
therefore banks will have to pay a higher return to debt holders, thus increasing the cost of funds 
and therefore reducing the supply of credit. Yet, this simply reflects the real cost of bank debt and 
therefore constitutes a key information for banks to be able to lend efficiently. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the redefinition of claims once a critical level of capital is 
reached  changes  the  incentives  to  managers  and  therefore  should  reduce  the  moral  hazard 
associated with the excessively generous bail-outs that are the rule during a banking crisis and 
improve corporate governance. 
 
 
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
In  the  context  of  the  current  crisis,  two  key  issues  have  surfaced  that  constitute  serious 
weaknesses in the corporate governance of banks: managers’ bonuses and dividend policy. POST CRISIS REGULATION  8
The issue of bank managers’ compensation has been preeminent as it has led to public outcry as 
State aid has been seen as siphoned into managers’ pockets. The outcry led to proposals and in 
some countries to the drafting of legislation limiting this compensation (tax rates of 90% have 
been proposed in the US, bonuses banned in firms receiving State aid in France). Such a picture is 
distorted because, first, a number of compensation packages, possibly the majority, are based on 
stock  options,  second  the  bonuses  may  be  a  market  remuneration  practice,  as  it  happens  for 
traders, and third, because, some division managers within an institution in distress may have 
genuinely created added value within a profitable division of the distressed institution.  
Because in the short run any bonus is a reduction in the shareholders’ value, the decision to pay 
for talent is to be taken by shareholders as they are the ones to internalize the trade-off between the 
marginal costs and benefits of an increase in managerial talent, as well as to see the difference 
between salaries and bonuses. The question is then whether corporate governance is adequate so 
that shareholders take the decisions that maximize the bank’s value. When the remunerations of 
top  executives  are  voted  at  board  meeting  with  limited  control  by  shareholders  and  limited 
transparency, we may suspect the board of self dealing at the expense of other stakeholders. So, in 
spite of the public outcry that has led to caps in compensation packages, compensation is not the 
real issue but a symptom of inadequate corporate governance, which is a deeper and more complex 
issue. 
On the second issue, that of dividend policy, Acharya et al. (2009a) report that “The erosion of 
common equity has been exacerbated by large scale payments of dividends, in spite of widely 
anticipated credit losses”. In addition, the author’s report that banks having received State aid and 
in serious risk of failure have continued to pay out dividends. In both cases it implies that the 
rights of a third party, whether debt holders or taxpayers, have not been respected in the dividend 
decision. 
Related to these two seemingly overoptimistic payout policies is a third issue, provisioning. As 
mentioned before, banks’ insufficient provisioning for risky investments has been criticized, and 
the need for regulation to include compulsory dynamic provisioning has been evoked. Yet, this 
lack of provisions, directly related to the dividend policy, has its origin in a combination of ill 
defined  bankruptcy  procedures  (possibly  with  the  government  implicit  guarantees)  and  weak 
myopic corporate governance.  
These excessively generous payout policies point at excessively weak external monitoring of 
corporations and lead to question banks’ corporate governance and its role in the current crisis.  
 The regulation of banks’ corporate governance should state:  
1)  When  is  it  that  a  bank  operation  has  created  value  to  its  stakeholders,  thus 
avoiding the “fake alpha” issue of hidden losses ignored by the management and due to the lack of 
adequate  risk  provisioning.  The  correct  provisioning  of  risks  would  make  this  issue  less 
preeminent, but still the added value by a manager in the banking industry is only known three to 
five years after she has taken her decisions. This implies that compensation should either be lagged 
or, simply, be exclusively based on stocks and stock options held for a sufficiently long period of 
time.  
2)  What is the role of taxpayers as potential future stakeholders in banks’ corporate 
governance?  This  is  a  delicate  issue  as  an  excessive  representation  could  be  tantamount  to  a 
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extreme, the lack of representation leads to the bank’s biased investment decisions, as the cost to 
taxpayers  of  a  possible  bail-out  is  ignored.  During  a  crisis  taxpayers,  may  become  the  main 
stakeholders of a bank, so they should protect their interests through the regulatory authorities. 
Still, in normal times there a risk that taxpayers influence may lead to excessively conservative, 
inefficient bank investment decisions. So, a possible way out is to increase the representation of 
taxpayers  on  the  board  of  directors  if  a  systemic  crisis  is  declared.  This,  in  a  way,  will 
acknowledge that during a crisis taxpayers are the banks’ owners
1.    
 
 
5. REFORMING THE SAFETY NET 
The  crisis  has  placed  the  safety  net  under  great  strain,  yet  some  components,  like  deposit 
insurance,  have  been  resilient  and  helped  to  maintain  financial  stability.  Others,  like  capital 
requirements,  have  failed  or  led  to  new  risks.  We  will  focus  on  those  issues  and  consider 
successively capital requirements, and lender of last resort policy. 
 
5.1 Capital requirements 
 
As  the  crisis  has  unravelled,  capital  requirements  regulation  has  been  questioned  on  several 
grounds. It has become clear, first, that some risks were underestimated; second that those risks 
depended on the business cycle and on the well functioning of the financial system; third, that 
mechanisms for emergency recapitalization were required and fourth that the aggregate risk of the 
financial industry, not just the banking industry, mattered for financial stability.  
Still, it should be emphasized that adding additional layers of capital will impair the efficiency of 
the banking system if it is not accurately justified. Thus some reports (e.g. Turner, 2009, p.7) that 
recommend 1) an increase in capital 2) to compute the risks through the cycle rather that as point 
in  time  and  3)  to  provision  for  business  cycle  risk  through  the  creation  of  Economic  Cycle 
Reserves can be suspected of triple counting the necessary capital. Yet, at the same time in a 
systemic crisis this capital may not be sufficient, as the data on some recent banks in distress seem 
to indicate (e.g. Northern Rock). So, a proposal of, say, tripling the capital requirement of banks 
would dwarf the banking industry while it is not clear that it would allow it to survive a repetition 
of the current crisis. 
 
5.2 Improving risk measurement: micro-prudential 
The current crisis has highlighted serious flaws in risk measurement, both in banks’ internal 
models and in Basel II foundational approach. 
 
1.  Preventing  asset  bubbles.  As  Basel  II  gives  the  banking  regulatory  authorities  power  to 
supervise the risk assessment, when central banks, within their new macro-prudential mandate, 
identify a possible bubble, as it is the case when a significant divergence between an asset price 
and the expected net present value of its future cash is observed, regulatory authorities should 
check that the commercial banks’ risk models account for the increased risk. This may take into 
                                                            
1 In one well-known exchange with a railroad executive, J.P. Morgan, said, "Your railroad? Your railroad belongs to my 
clients”. The difference with the present situation is that J.P.Morgan was a member of the board. POST CRISIS REGULATION  10 
account loan to value in the case of mortgages, but it could as well consider asset growth, as 
excessive  growth  is  known  to  be  a  source  of  banks’  risk.  Implementing  a  rigorous  risk 
measurement  will  requires  a  degree  of  regulatory  independence  which  has  not  always  been 
reached,  particularly  when  it  refers  to  residential  housing  market  (Calomiris,  2009),  but  more 
generally when it seems to constrain the development of domestic credit market.  If, for instance, 
the Irish authorities require higher capital to invest in real estate related loans then it is easier for a 
non Irish bank to invest in the Irish mortgage market. Irish banks will then argue they face unfair 
competition.  Yet, as the risk of an asset depends on its correlation with the portfolio, Irish banks 
heavily ridden with Irish mortgages are facing higher risks than foreign competitors with a more 
diversified  portfolio.  The  use  of  the  second  pillar  in  this  case  allows  limiting  exuberant 
expectations and pyramidal schemes.  
2.  An Over the Counter (OTC) risk premium: AIG and Lehman’s crises have shown that over 
the counter derivative markets have higher risks than organized ones. Consequently the regulator 
should  reject  any  risk  models  where  over  the  counter  operations  have  the  same  risk  as  those 
performed  in  an  organized  market.  It  may  be  argued  that  this will  diminish  the  incentives  to 
innovate  in  the  banking  industry.  Yet,  as  some  of  the  innovations  are  aimed  at  bypassing 
regulation, reassessing rigorously the risks and capital charges for these operations will penalize 
innovations driven by regulatory arbitrage but not productive innovations.  
3.  Correct for discrepancies between ratings and spreads: In an efficient market spreads give 
better  information  than  ratings,  so  that  there  is  no  free  lunch.  Consequently  any  discrepancy 
between the two is prima facie evidence of a model error. Computing risk on the basis of ratings, 
whether internal or external, should be therefore justified only by superior information. In other 
words, in case of discrepancy between the market and the internal or external model, the market 
should prevail except for well documented operations. This simple rule would have helped limit 
the investment in AAA subprime tranches with spreads clearly above average and the losses of 
UBS.  
4.  Reviewing securitization related risks. Theoretically Basel II imposes capital charges on a 
securitized loan that are equal to the ones of a buy and hold strategy, making regulatory arbitrage 
impossible.  Still,  the  sensitivity  of  securitized  loans  and  more  sophisticated  instruments  like 
Collateralized Debt Obligations CDOs based on securitized loans to a systemic crisis has been 
undervalued,  
5.  Compute a maturity mismatch capital charge as part of pillar capital requirements not as it is 
nowadays  part  of  pillar  2.  This  would  reflect  not  only  interest  rate  risk  but  also,  even  more 
important liquidity risk. 
6.  Finally, even if, strictly speaking provisions are not part of a financial institution’s capital,  
in order to correct for the procyclical behaviour of banks’ loan losses, the bank should make 
provisions on every loan, thus reflecting the expected loan losses as insurance companies do with 
their mathematical provisions. The Spanish statistical provisioning scheme (See Box 2) could be a 








BOX 2: Spanish Statistical/Dynamic Provisions 
Bank loans resemble an insurance product because loan defaults are the equivalent of accidents for an 
insurance company. This implies that as insurance companies have to make mathematical provisions, so 
banks should be required to make the equivalent statistical or dynamical provisions. Still, there is one 
important difference:  the amount of banks loan losses is determined also by the business cycle.  
In an upturn, banks set looser credit conditions in view of the low level of contemporaneous non-
performing loans. This leads them to a portfolio of low quality loans that will only become apparent 
three years later during downturns.  
 
Observing that banks did not provision for business cycle risks, the bank of Spain introduced in 2000 
a  statistical  provision  regulation.  This  contradicted  the  accounting  rules  set  by  the  international 
accounting standards Board (IASB) which were applied in 2004, requiring a revision on the statistical 
provisioning regulation.  In spite of the change, some accounting experts still consider that the Spanish 
statistical provision violates the IASB rules. The regulation contemplates either an internal model or a 
standard approach. In both cases the bank will set provisions during good times for the defaults in 
downturn. Thus, for instance, the standard approach considers six categories of risk of which the two 
higher  risk  ones  are  the  medium-high  risk  (e.g.  personal  credits  to  finance  purchases  of  durable 
consumer goods) and the high risk (e.g. credit cards balances, current account overdrafts and credit 
account  excesses).  The  amount to  be provisioned  is  a  linear  function  of  the  (positive  or  negative) 
change in the stock of loans and of the difference between the average percentage of provisions across 
the cycle as set by the Bank of Spain and the bank’s effective percentage of provisions on its loans. 
In this way, during a downturn the statistical provisioning requirement are negative and the growth in 
specific provisions can be met using the statistical fund instead of the P&L account. 
The statistical provisions were included in Tier 2 capital, that is, up to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted 
assets and since 2004 are tax deductible, although with a cap. (See Banco de España. (2004)) 
 




5.3 Emergency recapitalization  
 
In spite of the proposed improvement in prudential regulation it is still quite likely that a too-big-
to-fail institution has to be recapitalized. Still, notice that the issue is directly related to banks’ 
bankruptcy regime that we examine hereafter, as any dilution in debt holders rights, as a debt 
equity  swap,  immediately  and  automatically  generates  capital.  In  general,  State  aid  has  been 
available to rescue banks that are in trouble, quite often as tier 2 capital. Although this has a cost to 
tax payers, it limits the conflicts with shareholders and therefore allows for a quick resolution. It is 
clear that in a systemic crisis this has a positive externality on the whole banking industry which 
contrasts with the effect of State aid in other industries (e.g. the automobile industry). Still, in the 
third quarter of 2009, once banks are starting to have funds from the market, the difference on the 
cost of funds between large and small banks have reached 30 basis points and this is thought to 
reflect  the  government  implicit  guarantees  to  too-big-to-fail  banks  and  therefore  unfair 
competition. 
To solve the issue of emergency recapitalization in case of systemic crisis, Kashiap et al. (2008) 
propose  to  implement  a  capital  insurance  scheme.  They  argue  that  in  normal  times  holding 
additional  capital  buffers  would  reduce  the  incentives  of  debt  and  its  market  discipline. 
Consequently,  to  generate  capital  during  a  systemic  crisis,  banks  need  a  “banking-industry 
catastrophe insurance” scheme. If the insurance scheme is private, this would be priced according 
to the market and avoid the implications for tax-payers. The idea of a private scheme, attractive as 
it is, has not been received without some scepticism. Indeed, the pay-out to insured banks in the 
event of a crisis the insurance fund that has to rise is such that it will also affect all financial 
markets   . This means that the insurance fund should invest only in Treasuries or bank reserves if 
it is structured as a bank, which imposes a high opportunity cost. Also, as the insurance fund has to 
liquidate its assets, even in the more favourable case where there is sufficient liquidity in the 
market, this would generate an adverse effect on the market prices and therefore a huge cost to the 
fund. In addition, the experience of AIG providing private insurance against the credit market has 
shown that the incentives of the insured and those of the insurance company may sometimes be 
misaligned.  So the support of the central bank will be needed, whether through a credit line or a 
repurchase commitment, and, consequently, the challenge is to design a mechanism of contingent 
emergency capital provision, like the one suggested, with the support of the Central Bank but 
without the inconvenience of a Government intervention.  
 
5.4 Monitoring the financial system aggregate capital  
The justification of a capital buffer to cover unexpected losses is clearly stated in Basel II. The 
requirement that capital should be accounted for in so far as the holder of capital is able to sustain 
the unexpected loss on its capital is consistent with this view. This point becomes obvious with the 
requirement of Basel II to consider supervision on a consolidated basis rather than on a solo base. 
Indeed, it would be possible for a banking group to hold very limited external investors capital 
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banks in the group. This general principle applies beyond consolidation and is illustrated by the 
AIG case.  
AIG did not have the capacity to cover its losses and therefore these losses would have been 
transferred to the banking system creating systemic risk. The same is true for shadow banking: the 
lack of capital of structured investment vehicle (SIVs) and other conduits implied that the risks had 
to be transferred to other agents. As these were often equipped with commercial banks’ liquidity 
lines,  the  risks  were  transferred  back  to  the  commercial  banks.  The  implication  is  that  the 
aggregate  capital  of  the  financial  industry,  not  just  the  one  for  commercial  banks  should  be 
considered. This does not imply that a unique regulator should be in charge of the whole financial 
system as it has been suggested, but that some minimal monitoring of aggregate systemic risk 
should be undertaken. 
 
5.5  Disclosure 
G20 meetings conclusions have particularly emphasized the issue of disclosure. This is clearly a 
critical issue, and more transparency may indeed be desirable, but a number of points should be 
addressed. First, it should be acknowledged that banks assets are opaque, which sets an ultimate 
limit  to  the  extent  of  disclosure.  Second,  the  disclosure  discussion  has  always  focused  on 
disclosure to large market participants. Yet disclosure to the banks’ clients might also improve the 
overall allocation of funds and reduce the riskiness to the bank. As of today it is unclear whether 
banks’ uninsured depositors know what they are to expect in case of bankruptcy, as the banks’ 
contracts are the same and no discontinuity on the interest rate spread occurs. Illustrating this lack 
of disclosure to the bank retail client , Anderson and Dokko(2009) show completely different 
patterns of delinquency for the borrowers that has an escrow account for their taxes and a clear 
view of the payments their commitment implied and those that did not. 
Still, the main issue the current crisis has unveiled is related to credit rating agencies in their role 
of collecting information and disclosing it to the market. Because the duplication of monitoring 
efforts between investors and rating agencies is inefficient, a better definition and regulation of 
credit rating agencies is critical. Still, it is generally agreed, that better information should allow 
investors to impose efficient market discipline. So, the question is what is better information? A 
thought-provoking answer is provided by Dewatripont and Rochet (2009) as they quote Keynes 
and argue that “it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong”.  Indeed, if Basel II rules 
combined  with  the  complexity  of  internal  models  are  susceptible  of  manipulation  and  yield 
information too complex to be processed by the market, then investors will resort to simple thumb 
rules, such as the leverage ratio to exert market discipline. Acknowledging this would provide 
some guidance on what the efficient disclosure of information by banks should be. This may limit 
the undesired impact of uninformed market discipline. 
 
6. MACRO-PRUDENTIAL AND MONETARY POLICY 
 
6.1  Macro-prudential regulation 
The  link  between  business  cycle  and  risk  assessment  with  its  implications  on  capital 
requirements is one of the key issues regulatory reform should address. Four aspects are critical. POST CRISIS REGULATION  14 
First, as stated by Dewatripont and Rochet (2009), a mechanism to formally declare a systemic 
crisis would be required as it enables to redefine the rights and responsibilities of both commercial 
banks  and  regulatory  authorities  once  a  systemic  crisis  is  declared.    This  will  allow  defining 
regulatory rules that would apply only during a systemic crisis but that a bank in trouble cannot 
invoke in normal times. The decision can be based on a number of automatic thresholds being 
reached which limits the possibilities of lobbying by banks as well as political interference. Of 
course, once the crisis is declared regulatory institutions independence will be limited, as each 
bail-out is a governmental decision. 
 
Second, as the crisis has highlighted the critical importance of bubbles, macro-prudential policy 
should implement mechanisms for the identification of asset prices bubbles. This mandate should 
presumably be part of the central banks responsibilities, as this institution is equipped with the 
information required to identify a bubble.  This information need not be public, but will be a 
critical  input  in  both  the  banks internal  rating  models  and  their  supervision by  the  regulatory 
authorities. This role of central banks in providing macro-prudential information to supervisory 
authorities would be quite consistent with the monitoring of overall leverage in the banking and 
financial industry, which absence during the current crisis has had a negative impact. 
 
Third, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) consider the issue of banks’ risk measurement from a 
perspective encompassing a wider view of the markets, and so taking into account the contagion 
effects due to the distress of other banking institutions. Although value at risk (VaR) already 
reflects the variations in the business cycle, as the Basel II approach is based on the unique factor 
Merton (1974) model, it does not take into account the interaction between banking risks and 
markets  when  banks  are  in  distress.  This  has  led  Adrian  and  Brunnermeier  to  put  forward  a 
different risk measure, CoVaR as “the value at risk (VaR) of financial institutions conditional on 
other institutions being in distress”. Using this concept, they show a significant CoVaR increase 
among financial institutions in the years before the crisis and important fluctuations in the wedge 
between CoVaR and VaR. This idea could be extended to cope with the illiquidity of the market, 
which is neither contemplated by Basel II nor in the design of fair value accounting rules. Indeed a 
bank’s liquidity mismatch that is considered of low risk and managed by accessing the interbank 
markets becomes a high risk when there is a generalized liquidity shortage.  
 
Fourth, to cope with the negative impact of banks’ capital regulation through the business cycle, 
regulation should impose more stringent capital requirements during good times that could be 
lowered in bad times. This would take into account the fact that risks should be computed through 
the cycle, not just at a point in time. Repullo, Saurina and Trucharte (2009) analyse this issue and 
compare different procedures to account for the capital procyclicality. Their empirical analysis 
shows  that  the  best  procedure  is  to  use  a  simple  multiplier  of  the  Basel  II  requirements  that 
depends on the deviation of the rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product with respect to its 
long-run  average.  Capital  requirements  would  be  increased  in  expansions  (or  decreased  in 
recessions) by 7.2% for a one standard deviation change in Gross Domestic Product growth.  
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6.2  Monetary policy 
Three issues should be considered regarding monetary policy. First, a lax monetary policy during 
the  pre-crisis  period  has  been  held  responsible  for  nurturing  asset  price  bubbles  and 
macroeconomic fragility. Second, during the crisis period, monetary policy has changed course 
and has focussed exclusively on the provision of liquidity at low interest rates.  
 
Sustainable monetary policy 
A lax monetary policy could be compatible with low levels of inflation if the excess liquidity is 
channelled into asset prices. This means that maintaining a lax monetary policy may come at a 
cost, as this represents a distortion with respect to the long term equilibrium that at one point will 
have to revert to its “fundamental value”. Of course, the existence of current account imbalance 
makes this issue more complex.  
Traditionally, monetary policy objective is price stability, as the European Central Bank’s unique 
objective, or at a combination of price stability and economic growth, as it is the case for the US 
Federal Reserve. It is not clear that the current crisis will change the way monetary policy is 
conducted. Yet, the impact of interest rate deviations has been made clear. In the design and 
implementation  of  monetary  policy,  central  banks  should  take  into  account  that,  with  some 
probability however small, low interest rates imply higher macroeconomic fragility and financial 
instability.  This  may  have  an  impact  on  interest  rates.  Still,  if  financial  institutions  take  into 
account the risk of a bubble in their internal risk models, there is no need for monetary policy to 
take into account asset prices. 
 
 Emergency liquidity management  
Regarding liquidity injection, the behaviour of central banks across the world has been quite 
consistent. They have injected as much liquidity as required by the financial system. Of course, the 
difference between injecting liquidity and subsidising banks depends on the collateral that is used 
and the price that is set for the collateral. Here the policy of both the European Central Bank and 
the US Fed has been to lend against a large class of eligible collateral. By so doing, central banks 
have departed from their traditional cautious lending policy and have taken risks that may result in 
future losses. Still, central banks liquidity injection has limited the number of banks in distress, 
avoiding a worsening of the crisis.  
Perotti and Suarez (2009) suggest an alternative to the central bank intervention through the idea 
of mandatory liquidity insurance. During good times, the Emergency Liquidity Insurance Fund 
would receive the liquidity insurance premia and once a systemic crisis is declared it would use its 
“pre-packaged access to central bank liquidity and government funds backing”.  Thus the fund 
could not be used by a bank facing a liquidity shortage in normal times: such a bank would have to 
face market discipline. Yet the fund has the advantage of providing a “guarantee on uninsured 
wholesale funding” thus preventing the financial accelerator and contagion effects we have seen. 
As central banks have actually provided emergency liquidity provision, the differences should be 
emphasized: a private institution would be able to price liquidity insurance correctly and by so 
doing  provide  the  right  incentives  for  banks  to  keep  more  liquid  assets  (but  notice  that,  as 
mentioned, liquidity is endogenous). Second, it would provide the market with certainty regarding POST CRISIS REGULATION  16 
liquidity  injection.  Still,  the  problem  of  eligible  collateral  would  remain  to  be  solved:  if  its 
definition is too strict, say T-Bills, the fund is useless; if it is too wide, say AAA mortgage back 
securities, it corresponds to capital, not liquidity injection. 
 
Interest rate policy. 
It has been often argued that monetary policy and prudential regulation were to be separated and 
implemented by different agencies. The recent events seem to challenge this view. By injecting 
liquidity at low interest rates banks solvency is generally improved. Consequently the question of 
the optimal interest rate policy is to be considered. 
Two recent theoretical contributions, Allen, Carletti and Gale(2008), and Freixas, Martin and 
Skeie (2009) argue that this is indeed the case. The efficient functioning of the interbank market is 
improved by setting low interest rates during a crisis and higher interest rates in normal times. The 
implication is here that monetary policy should also take into account the possible risks associated 
with  a  systemic  crisis.  At  these  interest  rates  the  Central  Bank  should  provide  the  aggregate 
amount of liquidity banks require.  
Perotti and Suarez (2009) liquidity insurance proposal would have a similar effect as the cost of 
liquidity is higher in normal times because of the liquidity insurance premium. 
 
7.  THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CHALLENGE 
The definition of a uniform minimal set of rules for banking regulations that would allow safe 
and sound banks to compete in a “level playing field” has been since its creation the objective of 
the  Basel  committee.  The  output  of  the  committee  has  defined  a  framework  for  transnational 
banking operations that has allowed to establish some uniform international banking system. Yet, 
beyond these minimal rules, the design of international banking regulation raises two key issues. 
First, each regulatory authority has as a mandate to preserve the stability of the banking system 
in its own country. Implicit in this is the fact that the banking system has to prosper and grow, and 
therefore the international regulatory game is basically a non-cooperative game.  
The  second  issue  international  coordination  has  to  solve  is  the  issue  of  emergency 
recapitalization. Once a bank operates as a truly international bank, its bail-out or its liquidation 
affects not only the global financial stability but also the costs and benefits each country has to 
bear  in  the  operation,  independently  of  its  country  of  origin.  As  these  costs  and  benefits  are 
unknown, the problem is a classical problem of financing of a public good. Each country will tend 
to free ride on the home country and therefore large multinational banks will not be bailed out. 
This according to the Turner report was a key factor in the bankruptcy of Lehman (p. 37). Only an 
ex ante commitment on clearly set rules for burden-sharing among countries could solve this type 
of problem (Freixas, 2003; Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 2006), but, as of now such a commitment 
does not appear a feasible option., To attenuate the conflicts of interest it would be interesting that 
the host countries have an option to require the bank branch to become a subsidiary once its size 
threatens financial stability in the host country. This could be relevant when the major systemic 
bank in one country is regulated by a foreign country as it happens in some eastern European 
countries. The option to require the transformation of a branch into a subsidiary could apply also 
once the dimension of the country cannot guarantee the deposit insurance, as was the case for the 













































Lessons from the Icelandic banking crisis. 
Operating in accordance with the EU second directive of single banking passport, the Icelandic bank Landsbanki 
opened a branch in the UK and under the Icesave brand raised retail deposits by offering often 50% more than 
British high street banks. Also in agreement with the European rules regarding deposit insurance, the Icelandic 
deposit insurance scheme covered up to the value of €20,887 so that in order to compete with the more generous 
UK deposit insurance scheme it was authorized to buy additional deposit insurance, a top-up, to the level of 
£50,000. As the UK chose post paid deposit insurance this did not imply a higher cost for Landsbanki, but the 
commitment to share the losses of defaulting UK banks. Landsbanki attracted £4.5 billion in the UK.  
The situation of Iceland banks then deteriorated and the Icelandic government indicated that it was in no position 
to meet the liabilities its deposit insurance (the GDP of Iceland was about 5,5 billion computed at the November 7
th 
exchange rate, Danielsson 2008). As deposits above £50,000 were not insured, fearing a panic, on October 9
th 
2008, Premier Minister Gordon Brown ordered to freeze the assets of Landsbanki branch in the UK using the Anti-
Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. 
 
Lessons: 
·  The choice of such a spectacular measure proves that the European “single passport” banking directive 
does not provide the host country with appropriate instruments to cope with the failing of a bank in 
another European country.  
·  It also shows that if a foreign deposit insurance company goes bankrupt, it leaves all the host countries 
where it operates in a dire situation as the host country will have to bear either the cost of the full 
repayment to insured depositors or the cost of bearing with the possible contagion effect.  
·  In addition, as illustrated by the UK crisis, it may be the case that the host country considers as a 
systemic  risk  the  repayment  of  uninsured  depositors  which  constitute  no  liability  to  the  foreign 
defaulting bank. 
·  Independently of the capacity of the host supervisory authorities, and independently of the existence of 
a top-up that means that the UK insurance scheme and the UK taxpayer’s funds could be at stake, the 
supervision of the branch is the unique responsibility of the home regulator. 
·  Landsbanki depositors were able to obtain the high interest rate promised on their savings during some 
time without incurring in the cost of failure. The UK government has thus assumed that depositors that 
invest in this high return low risk were uninformed in spite of the large amount of their investment. 
Charities, including children's hospices invested in these deposits to grasp the mythical free lunch.  
·  What were the ex ante options of the government? It is not clear that government warnings regarding 
the risky character of the investment would be acceptable under current EU rules.  POST CRISIS REGULATION  18 
 
The second crucial legal aspect is the bankruptcy procedure. The international banks’ bankruptcy 
laws  make  a  liquidation  process  more  complex,  because  countries  could  choose  between  two 
different perspectives on the different rights of their claimholders: territoriality or universality. 
Under  territoriality  each  country  considers  the  assets  and  liabilities  in  its  own  country;  under 
universality  all  assets  and  liabilities  are  jointly  considered,  independently  of  their  country  of 
origin.  This  generates  clear  conflicts  if  a  country  applying  territoriality  has  to  cope  with  the 
bankruptcy  of  a  foreign  bank  from  a  country  where  universality  is  the  rule.  This  has  led  the 
governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, to synthetize the issue in the now well-known 
observation that international banking is “global in life, but national in death”. Territoriality is an 
economically inefficient bankruptcy regime but has the advantage that it defines clear cut legal 
rules. On the other hand, universality requires a number of issues to be negotiated among the 
different participating countries and their stakeholders. Under universality the countries should 
face the issue of burden sharing that is simply avoided under territoriality.  
 
In Europe, the contradiction between, on the one hand, the soothing communiqués and the letters 
of mutual understanding among European regulatory agencies, and, on the other hand, the clear cut 
national mandates of the regulatory authorities was already understood. So, the crisis (in particular 
the downfall of Fortis) has made blatant what was already latent. The lesson to be drawn is that in 
fact Europe is much further away from a fully integrated financial market than what the second 
European banking directive (“single passport” directive) seemed to imply. The use of the United 
Kingdom antiterrorist law in order to freeze the assets the branch of Landsbanki in the United 
Kingdom (See Box 3) had, shows how far Europe is from a well defined scheme of international 
regulatory cooperation. A European definition of what an insured deposit is and what an uninsured 
deposit is, which implies effective convergence, would be welcome.  
 
8.   TO CONCLUDE: A CRITICAL REGULATORY CHOICE 
 
To conclude this view on the necessary regulatory reform, it is worth emphasizing the connection 
between the different components of the future regulation. Our view is that only two choices are 
possible, with no consistent intermediate options. 
The reason is that once we make a choice regarding banks’ bankruptcy procedures a number of 
other regulatory rules fall into place as their natural consequences.  
Two major cases are to be considered. 
Consider first a bankruptcy regime based on clearly defined contingent rights for debt holders, so 
that debt of certain characteristics becomes equity in the event of a banking crisis, whether through 
reverse convertible or through debt-equity swaps. In this case, the bank has to disclose the contract 
each type of liability holders has and make it clear avoiding mis-selling of products to uniformed 
depositors. This would imply that the term “deposit” would only be used for contracts that reflect 
the low risk and confidence that banks are suppose to encourage. This clarifies the role of market 
discipline as depositors are not supposed to exert market discipline, while convertible liability 
holders should do so. Implications on corporate governance follow. Indeed, the holders of these 
reverse  convertible  bonds  are  important  stakeholders  of  the  bank  and  therefore  should  be POST CRISIS REGULATION  19 
represented in the board of directors in order to allow debt holders to price correctly their bonds so 
as to reflect the long run cost of raising debt for the bank. Again, the reference to Modigliani-
Miller theorem allow us to pin down our argument: the price of debt immediately reflect the risk 
taken by the board and it is internalized in the board decisions so as to lead to the strategy that 
maximizes the value of the firm, not just the value of shareholders equity. 
 
At the other extreme, a bank bankruptcy regime where banks can only be intervened when their 
equity is negative implies that banks continue operating while a bank run is developing. This, in 
turn,  requires  a  larger  deposit  insurance,  and  possibly  the  extension  of  deposit  insurance  to 
uninsured deposits to cope with contagion, as illustrated, for instance by the Swedish crisis. It also 
entails  a  higher  risk  of  moral  hazard  and  herding  behaviour  on  behalf  of  bank  managers. 
Consequently, banks deposit contracts constitute a safe asset independently of its amount and 
maturity. The implication, in terms of corporate governance, is that taxpayers are stakeholders and, 
therefore, their interests should be represented. In this case, the board of directors should include 
representatives of taxpayers (regulatory authorities), who will consider the cost to taxpayers of the 
bank’s strategy.   
The choice between the two is not obvious, but two points should be made. First, considering 
only one side of the alternative as seems to be the position of the Turner review (Turner, 2009, p.7) 
that advocates the extension of deposit insurance may lead to a biased decision. Second, there 
seems  to  be  no  intermediate  road:  a  bankruptcy  regime  with  only  some  characteristics  of  the 
contingent debt equity swap will have to be quite generous on deposit insurance and therefore will 
imply the same costs as the non-contingent bankruptcy regime without any of its benefits. Finally, 
international competition between the two schemes may lead, not to the dominance of the most 
efficient institutions, but to the prevalence of the one that is more heavily subsidized by taxpayers, 
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